Abstract: U.S. financial deregulation is often popularly presented as a fundamental attack on financial regulation that began with neoliberalism's Big Bang in 1980. This paper argues this position is wrong in two ways. First, it is a process that stretches back decades before 1980. Textbook mentions of 1970s precursor "financial innovations" fall far short of presenting the breadth and duration of the pre-1980 attack on the system of regulation. Second, it has not been an across-the-board attack on financial regulation in the name of market efficiency as required by its ideology and claimed by its advocates, but rather a focused attack on only one of the five pillars of the system of regulation. This paper develops both of these assertions through a presentation of the five central pillars of the pre-1980 system of financial regulation, and the four major attacks on the three different aspects of the restrictions on financial competition.
This short paper on neoliberal financial deregulation will focus on two aspects of it that we maintain have been under-discussed. The first is that neoliberal financial deregulation in fact was almost entirely focused on only one of five pillars of the pre-neoliberal financial regulatory structure. This paper will indicate the aspects of the pre-neoliberal financial regulatory structure that neoliberal finance did not attempt to deregulate or were even strengthened. The implication of this behavior is that neoliberal deregulation has not been driven by an honest commitment to the ideology that unregulated markets are always socially best (most efficient) as finance asserts.
The second is that "the birth of neoliberalism [was] a process extended over time."
1 We argue that the cannonade referred to above must be understood only as an important acceleration of a process already unfolding, not as it is too often incorrectly presented as the "beginning" of 2 neoliberal financial deregulation. This paper will discuss four important prior financial deregulatory efforts.
The Pre-Neoliberal Financial Regulatory Structure
To avoid the common current misunderstanding of neoliberal financial deregulation as a drive to eliminate all regulation of financial markets, it is important to understand that preneoliberal financial regulation consisted centrally of five pillars: 1) federal deposit insurance, 2)
measures that directly regulate what various financial institutions are allowed to do, 3) measures that require financial institutions to greatly increase publically available financial information ("increase transparency"), 4) measures to limit competition between financial institutions, and 5) measures to allow (and corresponding practices to actually effect) the government's active intervention as a participant into financial markets. We will see that contrary to neoliberal ideology, neoliberal deregulation has consisted of a sustained attack on only one of these pillars, the restrictions on competition. The point we want to underline before turning to the regulatory pillar that was the target of neoliberal deregulation is that financial regulation itself was not under attack. None of the above three pillars were subjected to significant legal assaults. Deposit insurance was not eliminated, the Fed's and other regulatory bodies' legal powers were not significantly reduced, and there was no drive to eliminate the basics of public disclosure of information on stocks and bonds.
4) Neoliberal financial deregulation has been a prolonged attack on pillar 4 of the system of financial regulation, measures to limit competition between financial institutions. The three 4 main legal restrictions against unrestricted competition between financial institutions were: i) Geographical restrictions on banks, on branching. For historical/technological/cultural reasons less that 2% of banks had branch offices in 1900 (Litan 1987, 24) . But by the early 20th century states were generally encouraging banks to branch intrastate to provide banking services to their populations outside their main cities. 7 The
McFadden Act of 1927 then reversed this trend by restricting any new branching outside the city where a bank had its head office, but to get this anti-branching provision passed it had to grandfather in all existing state-bank intercity branch networks (Vieto 1987, 14) . Despite this, multi-office banks of various types (branches, "chains," bank holding companies) had more than 50% of all deposits just before the Depression (Litan 1987, 25) . The Glass-Steagall and 1935
Banking Acts then reinforced the legal proscription of interstate, and tried to further reduce intrastate, branching. deposits ("checking accounts"), 9 and empowered the Fed to set limits on payments on time deposits ("savings accounts"). While it was arguably the central target of effective deregulation by "financial innovation" from the 1950s to the 1970s, it is important to understand that the restrictions on competition were actually significantly broader than just this.
iii) Compartmentalizing of especially the product markets, and to a lesser extent the sources of funds ("segmented liability and asset markets"). In the first instance there was the issue of separation of finance from non-financial production ("commerce"), to protect national production from being subordinated to the interests of finance. Then within finance itself the same issue of separation showed up broadly in the debate about the separation of the major branches of finance such as commercial banking, investment banking and insurance, and again within the deposit taking sector in debates on the separation of banking for businesses, for consumer credit and for mortgages. By the 1920s the most powerful financial institutions were largely universal, 10 but that was sharply reversed after the 1929 crash with the financial collapse of the vertically integrated trusts and the legislation prohibiting such structures that followed. By far the best known and most discussed aspect of such regulatory separation was the separation of commercial from investment banking by the Glass-Steagall Act, but this was actually just one aspect of the important much broader compartmentalization. "Until the 1970s, each major field of the financial services industry -banks, thrifts, security firms, insurance companies -was almost entirely specialized to itself and supervised mainly by its own regulatory institution"
(D'Arista 1994, 186).
5) Measures to allow (and corresponding practices to actually effect) the government's active intervention. This aspect of financial regulation which today is nearly universally accepted and practiced by neoliberal governments around the world is of course directly contrary to the their claimed ideology of self-regulating financial markets. These measures have in fact been extended legally or in practice (more extensive or more frequent use) under neoliberal "deregulation" in parallel with the process of the reduction of the restrictions on financial competition just discussed. The logic for the necessity of this increased financial regulation as part of neoliberal financial deregulation is that the reduced restrictions on financial competition tend to cause an increased systemic financial instability, which can only be prevented from causing problematic or disastrous crises if the government has strong powers to actively intervene in financial markets when crises begin to develop. The most common form of active 6 intervention is through interest rate manipulation, but the government's role as lender in times of crises (linked to the former) is ultimately more important for the survival of the system.
11
The Roots of Deregulation before the Neoliberal Era It is extremely important for understanding the successful neoliberal assault on the restrictions on financial competition to recognize the change in the attitude toward competition in finance by the economics profession, and especially by political policy makers as part of their overall changed ideology leading up to neoliberalism. Earlier many members of both of these groups had felt that "excessive" financial competition had made a significant contribution to causing the Great Depression. By the 1970s almost all government studies 12 on financial reform held that the system was crippled by "needless barriers to competition" and "serious … anticompetitive situations" (U.S. Congress 1973, 1) . The recommendations were to reduce or eliminate all three types of the important restrictions on financial competition discussed in the last section -geographic (branch restrictions), price competition for deposits (regulation Q) and compartmentalization. 13 In this section we will briefly consider the four most important such preneoliberal attacks.
1) The first major attack on the regulations against financial competition came immediately after the first such major restriction was enacted, the accounts in with MMMFs as "financial innovations" from the beginning of the 1970s that undermined regulation Q, but their role was actually significantly different. They were basically checkable accounts for which banks could (but did not) require prior notification for withdrawals, and thus were not classified as checkable accounts, and so could pay interest.
Unlike MMMFs they remained, however, subject to regulation Q interest ceilings on saving accounts. The most important difference, however, is that they played a vastly smaller role in the Q-caused disintermediation in the 1970s that was the ultimate cause of regulation Q's subsequent elimination.
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Much more important and much less discussed concerning the pre-neoliberal undermining of regulation Q's restriction on price competition for funds was the 1973 decision by the Fed to suspend interest rate ceilings on large (over $100,000) CDs.
3) Euromarkets
The third major assault on the restrictions on U.S. financial competition unfolded over the 1960s through an expanded participation in the Euromarkets. While these markets were not originally developed in order to evade these U.S. domestic restrictions, banks "soon discovered that the Euromarket also enabled them to evade domestic New Deal financial regulations such as 9 reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings" (Helleiner 1994, 88) . and other commerce, and within finance. The act exempted from coverage BHCs that had only one bank (OBHC), almost all small banks. 21 The credit squeeze in 1966, however, caused a number of large banks to create OBHCs to avoid the Q-restrictions (Hester 1981, 181) , after which they realized how this structure could also be used to avoid the compartmentalization
restrictions. An explosion of new OBHCs followed in the next three years. 22 The 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act closed this exception for OBHCs, but continued to allow BHCs to engage in activities "closely related to banking." A government report three years later concluded that this possible exemption was being widely abused, resulting in allowing
BHCs to "act as investment advisors to real estate investment trusts and mutual funds, the leasing of personal and real property, providing bookkeeping and data processing services, operating insurance agencies and permitting bank holding companies to carry out other nonbank activities" (U.S. Congress, 1973, 16-17) . It is again important to understand that the breakdown of the stabilizing separation of banking from nonbanking functions occurred not only in the neoliberal 1980s and 1990s, but was a process that had occurred from the establishment of the separation, first through BHCs, then after 1956 through OBHCs and then after 1970 through extensive "closely related" exemptions.
In regards to the separation of functions within the banking industry, while right into neoliberalism specialized independent institutions (excepting property-casualty insurers) still dominated the different major components of the finance industry, the trend over the 1970s was clearly already toward the large financial firms in each sector beginning to branch out more and more into other sectors. " [T] he largest financial institutions were gaining footholds in major financial sectors outside their area of specialization at the same time as large nonfinancial firms were becoming important providers of financial services" (D'Arista 1994, 187).
Notes
1. Bakir and Campbell (2010, 339) . Although that paper's topic was the difference between the partially restored rate of profit and the less responsive rate of accumulation under neoliberalism, it is referenced here because the empirical data in it on the indebtedness of the Non-financial Business Sector, the increased share of its after-tax profits paid to the financial sector and its decline in size relative to the Financial Business Sector (among other measures) support the thesis that this paper argues, that many of the changes that were to become part of the new neoliberal structure were well underway decades before 1980.
2. While far from establishing the pre-neoliberal financial regulatory frame by itself, a strong case can be made that the most important single piece of legislation in that frame was the Banking Act of 1933 ("Glass-Steagall Act"), signed into law on June 16, 1933.
3. This initial coverage of Fed member banks was then extended. Any bank determined to be healthy by both state regulators and the FDIC could receive this coverage, and given people's fears of losing their deposits most, though not all, banks opted for this. Then in 1934 similar though separate deposit insurance was set up for Savings and Loans, Mutuals and Credit Unions, thus extending such insurance to essentially all depository institutions.
4. The initial level was 100% coverage for the first $2,500 of any deposit, hence fully covering small and medium deposits, and that threshold was then continually raised over the years.
5. Bank runs have historically been the greatest, though certainly not only, destabilizing threat for a banking system.
A large part of the 9,000 bank closures from 1930 to 1933 resulted from runs, especially in the two months before Roosevelt took office and declared the first national "bank holiday" (there were many previous state bank holidays), the only tool which was available for trying to stop bank runs before deposit insurance largely eliminated them.
6. Member banks now had to report on all investments transactions and loans. Non-member banks had to be reviewed for "soundness" to enter the FDIC program, which at that time the majority of banks felt compelled to do.
The Banking Act of 1935 gave important additional powers to the Fed, among others the particularly important new power to establish credit controls and margin requirements for buying stocks and bonds. It gave the FDIC the authority to intervene to protect a failing bank's deposits and capital by either facilitating the merger of the failing bank with a still healthy one, or by carrying out purchase and assumption actions. (Vietor 1987, 15) . [B]efore the end of the decade …the public policy of separating commercial banking from nonbanking business was seriously threatened with destruction" (U.S. Congress 1971, 16) . In 1966 there were roughly 600
OBHCs, with about 15% of total bank deposits. In the next three years an additional 210 OBHCs were formed, but these now held about 35% of all bank deposits. 27 conglomerates now ran banks and OBHCs were involved in 20 different financial and 99 different nonfinancial activities. Regulated multibank holding companies were by this time down to 100, with 15% of total deposits (D'Arista 1994, 69-70).
